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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1:
The lower court's granting of Galetka's motion to dismiss on the factual grounds
that it was "without opposition" was clearly erroneous, since there is insufficient
evidence to support it and because of glaring evidence that there was opposition to the
motion.
The Standard of review: The trial court's factual findings shall not be set-aside on
appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993).
Grounds for Seeking Review: Austin preserved this issue for appeal in her Response
in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted
oral argument on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313).
Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See. State v. Irwin , 924 P.2d 5, 7
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE #2:
The lower court's dismissal of Austin's Petition as moot, on me grounds that
Austin had been released from custody, was incorrect since Austin was actually a
1

parolee being significantly restrained in the Orange Street Community Correctional
Center.
The Standard of review; The lower court's determination that Appellant's Petition was
rendered Moot by her release from custody is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Gerrish v.
Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992).
Grounds for Seeking Review:
Austin preserved the issue of dismissal for appeal in her Response in Opposition
to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted oral argument
on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313).
Also, Austin had no opportunity to object to this ruling since it dismissed the
case. Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE #3;
The lower court's dismissal of Austin's petition as moot, on the grounds that
Austin had been released from custody, was incorrect because Austin is subject to the
collateral legal consequences of her conviction.
The Standard of review: The lower court's determination that Appellant's Petition was
rendered Moot by her release from custody is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for
2

correctness, according no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Gerrish v.
Barnes. 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992).
Grounds for Seeking Review:
Austin preserved the issue of dismissal for appeal in her Response in Opposition
to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted oral argument
on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313).
Also, Austin had no opportunity to object to this ruling since it dismissed the
case. Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See^ State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE #4
The lower court judge should have disqualified himself before deciding on
Galetka's motion to dismiss because in 1997, Austin's attorney had filed a complaint
against the lower court judge.
The Standard of Review; In determining whether a trial judge committed error by
failing to recuse himself or herself is a question of law, the appellate court reviews such
questions for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Grounds for Seeking Review:
When subsequent to the ending of a case, a party becomes aware of a matter
which would have provided grounds for the disqualification of the presiding judge, the
3

reviewing appellate court must decide on the propriety of the Judge's participation if
there is a sufficient basis to decide. See, Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1992). Austin's attorney, George L. Wright has provided this
appellate court with a copy of the complaint he filed against Judge Young in 1997.
(Addendum 2). The complaint provides this court with a sufficient basis to determine
whether Judge Young's participation in this case was proper. Regional Sales Agency,
Inc. v. Reichert. 830 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1992).
Also, Austin could not have made a timely objection to Judge Young's presiding
over this case because Austin did not know that Judge Young had been assigned to her
case before receiving his minute order dismissing the case. Therefore, Austin had no
chance, prior to the dismissal of the case, to request that Judge Young be disqualified.
Furthermore, it is the duty of the Judge, not of counsel, to disqualify himself
when he knows of a basis for disqualification. Regional Sales Agency, Inc, v. Reichert,
830 P.2d at 257 fn. 7 (Utah 1992).
Moreover, the lower court's error was plain in that the error exists, the error
should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See, State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).

4

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The following rules and statutes are determinative or relevant with respect to some
of the issues raised by Austin.
Utah Code Jud. Admin, R. CANON 3E(l)(a) (2000)
E. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
URCP Rule 65C(i) (2000)
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon
the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary
5

judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
Utah Code Ann, § 78-46-7 (1999)
§ 78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors — Persons not competent to
serve as jurors
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is:
(a) a citizen of the United States;
(b) over the age of 18 years;
(c) a resident of the county; and
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the English language.
(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony that has not been expunged is not
competent to serve as a juror.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. The Nature of the Case
This case is an appeal from an order dismissing a Petition for Post
Conviction relief. The lower court gave two reasons for so ruling: 1) Galetka's motion
to dismiss was without opposition and 2) Austin's petition was moot because she had
been release from custody. (R. 293-294).
b. The Course of Proceedings
On February 9, 1998 Appellant, Jennifer Austin ("Austin") pled guilty to a
second-degree felony (False Evidences of Title and Registration) and three
misdemeanors. (R. 64-66).
She signed a plea in abeyance agreement, which held the second-degree felony
in abeyance for 36 months if Ms. Austin completed the requirements of her probation.
(R. 55).
On May 11, 1998, Ms. Austin's probation was revoked due to a probation
violation. Ms. Austin was transported to the Utah State Prison for evaluation. She was
later sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 145).
More than six months after pleading guilty, on July 29, 1998, Ms. Austin,
through her present attorney George L. Wright, filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 148).
Later, upon her attorney's advice, Austin withdrew the appeal because Wright
believed that:
7

1) Since Ms. Austin had given up her right to withdraw her guilty plea in the plea
and abeyance agreement, the Court of Appeals could not hear her case;
2) Ms. Austin had given up her right to appeal pursuant to the plea in abeyance
agreement; and
3) Ms. Austin's appeal was untimely because the date of the entry of judgment
could reasonably be merged to the date of the entry of the plea. (R. 151 and R.
174).
Furthermore, since Ms. Austin's case involved allegations of denial of
Constitutional rights, Mr. Wright withdrew the appeal, believing that extraordinary
relief was the proper procedure. (R. 174).
On January 8, 1999, Appellant, Jennifer Austin, filed her petition for Post
Conviction relief. On March 15, 1999 the court determined that Austin's Petition was not
frivolous pursuant to Rule 65 C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Addendum 1 at
p. 2). The lower court scheduled the case for a hearing on June 7, 1999. Id. The lower
court also ordered Galetka to respond to Austin's memo by April 15, 1999. (Addendum
1 at p. 2). Nevertheless, Galetka failed to file a timely response to Ms. Austin's Petition
as ordered.
Instead, on April 15, 1999, Galetka filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
extraordinary relief. (Addendum 1 at p. 2). On May 19, 1999, Austin filed her response
in opposition to Galetkafs motion to dismiss and also filed a motion to amend the petition
8

ijdendum I I |i "i I in .Inin " 11 ")99, the parties conducted
oral ciir'uiin'iiii on (ialelka's motion ill dismiss (Addendum I .ill |i ii

I In/ toiiiil in led

that Austin was to amend its petition and that Austin's attorney, Mr. Wriphl could call
for a hearing date after he filed for the petition. (Addendum 1 at p. 3). On or about June
W, IW), Austin * attorney, George T ™-:^t called Galetka's attorney and 1- n
message
going to call the -:*MIV ~ -

. * : ( _j

touri anu mai ne wa«

.• . i .i

•• *

informed Mr. Wright that it could not set a date without a stipulation as to the uaiw
between counsels. Mr. Wright called Galetka's attorney, attempting to obtain an
agreeable dale lot1 the hearing, Galetka' s attorney ref used to agree, claiming that she
must first file a i c: sponse • to the petition be fore v ire set a date.
On June 11, 1999, Austin's amended petition for extraordinary relief was filed in
the lower court. (R. 168). On June 30, 1999, Galetka filed a motion for enlargement of
tune to respond to petition (R I i U) On .liilj < :», IW9, Vustin filed her opposition
n
July 14, 1999, Austin filed her Notice to Submit for a Decision pertaining to Galetka's
motion for enlargement of time to respond to petition, (TR1 1fi.TiThe court never ruled on
I ialelka' s motion for enlargement m nine to respond to petition,
MI lull • 'H 1^*W Galrtkii tiled Ins imtiineh lespunsc HI (itlilinii Irn posi •
conviction relief. (R. 187). In that response, Galetka a<v.m i • •* sf
9

should be dismissed. (R. 193-197). Austin's attorney again attempted to set a date for
hearing on the petition as ordered by Judge Dever. Again, Galetka's attorney failed to
cooperate in scheduling a date for hearing. Mr. Wright decided to wait until the Court
decided on Galetka's motion for enlargement of time to set the case for hearing.
On October 8, 1999, Galetka filed his motion to submit for a decision on his
request for dismissal. (R. 288).
On November 1, 1999, Judge David S. Young granted Galetka's motion to dismiss
"without opposition." (R. 293-294). The court also noted that Austin's petition was moot
because she had been released from custody. (R. 293-294). The court further indicated
that its minute entry would serve as the order of the court. Id.
On December 1, 1999, Austin filed her notice of appeal. (R. 299-300).
c. Background
On May 15, 1997, Jennifer Austin's current attorney, George L. Wright, filed a
complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission against Judge David S. Young.
(Addendum 2). Later, Mr. Wright represented, Jennifer Austin ("Austin"), during her
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, which is the subject of this appeal. Judge Dever had
presided over most of the Post Conviction proceedings. (Addendum 1). Unknown to
Austin and to her attorney, at some point in time, Judge Young was assigned to Austin's
case. (Addendum 1). His first act was to grant the Motion to Dismiss in favor of Galetka.
(R. 293-294).
10

i

tibstantive Facts

On January 111 , I'WJ i, „- tppclhinl, Ji'imilci Austin ,lmvc Ciislhoiui Il i II I MO Tli r
K f

car's owner sat in passenger's seat. ^k. 35-JOj. Trooper Rob B
i i r- ^ihle drunk drive* ~ 35-36). Tht passenger, _:
adniiitcu .*. ik/iu.. .^.n I.-M. *.*:! DL longed to him 'P \5 ^6)

;*

a ^ , mimediaiui)
A

—isfration cli *

attached to Liie ,
36). Since both occupants ua

;

tanding

^ ti

placed Austin and the passenger in custody. (R. 35-36). While conducting a search
Bench discovered a plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance, a pipe, and

Viv.

J5-J*

4

.

'

i-

'*

second-degree 1-J^JL, , License Plate and Registration Card Violations a class-C
misdemeanor; Driving on a Suspended c ~

oked License a class-B misdemeanour;

Failui i. lo Carry or Exhibit R egisti ation a class C misdemeanor; Possession of a
Controlled Subs I Ji i lit .'c,!' ;i duss \ misdemeanor, Possession ol 1 )ni>!, Paiaplienmlm, ii t • I: * ?: r •B niisdemeanor; and Failure to wear a Seat Belt a class-C niisdemeanor. (R. 44-4d »
On January 6, 1998, Judge Dever appointed an attorney to represent Ms, Austin.
IKi The same attorney was app<
din r a s r

i l i 1 ' i / i mi 'IIniliii«J''III I n Il ill'

' *o represent the passenger, Mr. Estey, in
-i

1111(1 I H'III ill i n dviM hri ol lhc potenlul

conflict of interest arising from the fact that he and his law I n in was also repr .
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the passenger. (R. 82-83). Austin's counsel also failed to advise the trial court of the
conflict of interest when counsel discovered that the passenger had confessed that the
vehicle belonged to him. (R. 82-83). Although the passenger had admitted that the car
belong to him, Austin's counsel advised her to waive her preliminary hearing without
explaining to her the chances of dismissing Counts I and II for lack of evidence that
Austin knowingly altered the registration sticker and that she knew that the car's license
plate was from another vehicle. (R. 82-83).
On February 9, 1998 Ms. Austin pled guilty to the following four offenses:
False Evidences of Title and Registration a second-degree felony; Driving on a
Suspended or Revoked License a class-B misdemeanor; Possession of a Controlled
Substance a class A misdemeanor; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor. (R. 229-230). She also signed a plea in abeyance agreement. (R. 244).
During that sentencing proceeding, the trial court informed Ms. Austin that she was
giving up her right to appeal this matter to a higher court. (R. 229 lines 14-15). Ms.
Austin signed a twelve-page plea in abeyance agreement, which stated that by signing
the agreement she had thirty days to withdraw her guilty plea. (R. 240).
According to the plea in abeyance agreement, the second-degree felony was to
be held in abeyance for 36 months if Ms. Austin completed the requirements of her
probation. (R. 242). On May 11, 1998, Ms. Austin's probation was revoked due to a
probation violation. (R. 263). Ms. Austin was transported to the Utah State Prison for
12

w,\> si lik'iiccil lii nil lii I i \i ,HS 111 lln I llrili ilalc hiMin ih

266).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I.
The lower court's finding that there was no opposition to Galetka's motion to
dismiss was clearly erroneous and absolutely unfounded. There are repeated onslaughts
of opposition contained in Austin's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and
in her oral argument, through counsel on June 7, 1999, in open air.
If, in an effort to give the lower court the benefit of the doubt, one stretches
reason to consider Galetka's Response to Austin's Petition as a motion to dismiss,
(since it also asks for dismissal), the finding of no opposition still lacks a legal basis.
This is true for two reasons: 1) the Response was not properly before the lower court
due to it being untimely and 2) Austin was not required to reply the Galetka's
Response.
ARGUMENT n.
The lower court also based its dismissal of Austin's Petition on the proposition
that, since Austin had been released, her petition was moot. However, as a parolee
subject to conditions, which significantly confine and restrain freedom, Austin's release
on parole does not render her petition for post conviction relief moot.
ARGUMENT ffl.
As a convicted felon in Utah Austin would be subject to laws allowing
impeaching of a Defendant with a prior conviction, and disqualifying her from serving
14

i HI ri )t»ii\ Since Austin would delmitely be subject to collateral legal consequences of

ARGUMENT IV.
In 1997, Austin's attorney filed a complaint with "the Judicial Conduct
Commission against the lower court Judge,, (Judge Young), concerning a matter outside
I liliiiiN itise. 1 his treated, a I least, a personal prejudice aga
" "I "h 1 "Aii

- ;"'" lawyer such

il iiiiiiiJi i .h nld haw il»iin|ii;ililicil

-

on Galetka's motion to dismiss. Since "the lower judge uiu w

1 li-mi, ulci iding

de on G.-iMkn^ urn HI U i

to dismiss, Austi n's right to a fair tribunal Has been infringed upon 'thereby violating
due process undti iiit uiiunJ Siait-> \ (institution and th~ TTtih Constitution.
. ctR^t
merits hearing on the Petition was to take n

..,

.

. ;y oraerew , * *

u t

dismissed the Petition upon questionable grounds. Thus, 'the outcome of the Petition
certainly would have had better results for A ustiii had the lower court judge disquair
iiniiiscli ,ii leqmini in urn n iniin (ill Judicial Conduct.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING OF GALETKA'S MOTION TO DISMISS
ON THE FACTUAL GROUNDS THAT IT WAS "WITHOUT OPPOSITION"
WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, SINCE THERE IS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT IT AND BECAUSE OF GLARING EVIDENCE THAT THERE
WAS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION.

The lower court dismissed Austin's Petition because Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss was without opposition. (R. 293-294). Thus, the factual basis for dismissing
Austin's Petition was that there was no opposition to the Galetka motion to dismiss.
Contrary to that, glaring facts demonstrating that there were oppositions to Galetka's
motion to dismiss are contained in Austin's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss and in her oral argument through counsel on June 7, 1999. (R. 152- 163 and
R. at 302). As to Austin's Response to Galetka's Motion to Dismiss, it contains 10
pages containing the following arguments in opposition:
1) Argument section I in that brief is entitled, "THE ISSUES IN MS.
AUSTIN'S PETITION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON
APPEAL." (R. 155).
2) The title of Section II of the briefs Argument states, "EVEN IF MS.
AUSTIN COULD HAVE RAISED THE ISSUES OF HER PETITION ON
DIRECT APPEAL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE

16

DJUDK
3) Subsection b iollov.t> stating Qiut, * i ^ w * . ^ ^ ,
not Limited - ~*

" , , ffective Counsel "" »T

I l I lie ioiiwWiii^
"I "iiiiiiiniill II 1 ill ni ni I III

Exception is

„.n states,
}

'in

<;

I lie I \)stn ^mictions Remedies \ ct

I Nubias Corpus I ' x u p l ,' \u Vt 'uinllll Il In I In,

Constitution." (R. 158).
5]

HKIII

*he lasi Section of Austin's Brief opposing Galetka's motion u>

i.-.u**^ entitled
CON*:

-

THE IMPORT/ v

(>!• MT<? AUSTIN'S

•

••

\-

*• i

THAT HER PETITION BE HEARD." (R.160).
No doubt Galetka's Motion to Dismiss faced opposition from Austin.
Furthermore, there is no excuse for the lower court refusing to hold in its

motion to dismiss (R ^0
diligence would have disc

le afore mentioned oppositions. Furthermore, once

an ordinary lower court found the opposition it would not and could not have

lower court's finding ic^ardinj1, this WHS lmlounih ill
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In order to meet her marshalling requirement, Austin submits the following.
Since only one motion to dismiss was filed, and it was definitely opposed. The only
evidence the lower court could have utilized to reasonably determined that Galetka's
motion to dismiss met no opposition from Austin, is if the lower court considered
Galetka's untimely Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief as the motion to
dismiss that it referred to in its Order. (R. 293-294). The court could have done this
because Galetka's Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief does argue that the
petition should be dismissed. (R. 193). Also supporting this is the fact that Austin did
not file a Reply to Galetka's Response (Addendum 1 at p. 3). Even so, such reasoning
lacks a legal basis to render it sufficient to support the finding that Galetka's motion to
dismiss met no opposition. See, Child v. Gonda, P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998).
First, there was no requirement that Austin file a Reply to Galetka's Response
To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief. This is true because once a Petition and a
Response are filed no other pleading or amendments are permitted unless the court
permits. Rule 65C(i) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Austin was not
required to reply to Galetka's Response.
Second, Galetka's Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief was
untimely and thereby not properly before the lower court. This is so because at the end
of the June 7, 1999 hearing on Galetka's motion to dismiss, lower court ordered that
the normal times for filing the briefs would apply. ( R. at 313). The normal time to
18

respond to a IVi'iii m iii. lliirtv days pluM linn allowed lor sirviuv URCP 6S('(i).

SIIKC

Austin filed her Amended Petition on June 11, 1999, Galetka had 30 days plus 3 days
(for being served by mail) to file his Response. (R. 168 ) (IJRCP:65C(i)"'and URCP
6(e)), I hereioiv, (ialelku liutl iiudl July 14 , 1999 to lile his response. Nevertheless,
C

that, although Galetka had filed a motion for an enlargement of time to respond on
June 30, 1999. vu- lower court failed to decide on his time enlargement moti : • a
(Addendum i a. .

Thus there was no court order to enlarge Galetka's time period

to lit'i"1 in: icsponr

•

be deemed a motion to dismiss hv:«:ise it was ..viewing the foregoing m L LL0LL

ntimely i esponse can not
, •! "•. -ore the coi ii 1: I hi is,

-It iu die iowci wuiirf s determination, there is

absolutely no factual basis for its finding that Galetka's Motion to Dismiss was without
opposil i< a i. S e e , S t a t e y . P e n a , hi\M lJ" J d {K\ 1, 9.4 !vM\ (I Hah 199^1» I Jius, its tat lual
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n this r e g a r d \\n\ \ \v n h n i o i i n i i i 1 iiiil

•

i i N i n m i ' i r l o i r <isKs llinl the

dismissal of 'this case be reversed.

1

Before the June 7th 1999 hearing, the lower court had also oidered thai (;,; -^ a
file his response by April 15, 1999, (Addendum 1 atp 2). Galetka tailed to meet mat
cut off date also. (Addendum 1 at p.3).
2
Austin filed her Opposition to the time enlargement motion and a
submit for a decision on the time enlargement motion. (R, 181 and 185)
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II.
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF AUSTIN'S PETITION AS MOOT, ON
THE GROUNDS THAT AUSTIN HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY,
WAS INCORRECT SINCE AUSTIN WAS ACTUALLY A PAROLEE BEING
SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRAINED IN THE ORANGE STREET COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONAL CENTER.
The lower court also based its dismissal of Austin's Petition on the proposition
that, since Austin had been released, her petition was moot. (R. 293-294). However,
Austin was a parolee at the time of the lower court's order dismissing her Petition.
(See. Addendum 3 (A letter, signed by Ms. Deborah Davidson, Director of Orange
Street Community Correctional Center)). Even if the lower court was correct in
labeling Austin as "released", Utah courts have adopted the federal rule that "release on
parole does not render a petition for habeas corpus moot because parole 'imposes
conditions which significantly confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom.'" Northern
v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham. 371
U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377, (1963)). When the lower court dismissed her
Petition Austin was confined at Orange Street Community Correctional Center.
(Addendum 3). This certainly renders Austin's confinement significant. Therefore,
Austin's release on parole did not make her Petition moot. Since the lower court's
ruling was incorrect in this regard, Austin asks that its dismissal order be reversed.
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III.
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF AUSTIN'S PETITION AS MOOT,
ON THE GROUNDS THAT AUSTIN HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM
CUSTODY, WAS INCORRECT BECAUSE AUSTIN IS SUBJECT TO THE
COLLATERAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF HER CONVICTION.
A criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any
collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction." Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968). Such
collateral legal consequences may include the use of the conviction to impeach the
petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as
the petitionees inability to vote, engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury. Id. In
Utah, Austin would be disqualified from serving on a jury due to her felony conviction.
See. Utah Code Annotated 78-46-7(2). As a convicted felon in Utah she would also be
subject to law allowing the impeaching a defendant, to inquire into the fact and nature
of the prior conviction. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982); citing
State v. Kazda. 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (Utah 1963). Since Austin would
definitely be subject to the possibility of collateral legal consequences of her conviction,
her Petition is not moot. Again, the lower court incorrectly dismissed her Petition as
moot; Austin asks that its dismissal order be reversed.
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IV.
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF
BEFORE DECIDING ON GALETKA'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE IN
1997, APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY HAD FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE.
In 1997, Austin's attorney filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct
Commission against the lower court Judge concerning a matter outside of this case.
(Addendum 2). Austin argues that since her attorney, filed a complaint against the
lower court judge, his impartiality might reasonably be questioned such that he should
have disqualified himself from rendering his decision granting Galetka's motion to
dismiss. (See. Addendum 2). Canon 3E (1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
states in part that,
"[a] judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or a party's lawyer."
Canon 3E (1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis added).
Thus, a "judge should recuse himself when his 'impartialityf might reasonably be
questioned." State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S.
1220, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988). No doubt, an appearance of bias existed in this case. A
judge will certainly appear to be biased against a party's attorney when that attorney
had previously filed a complaint against the judge. This is true because the filing of the
complaint was a personal matter against that Judge in particular, accusing no other
person save him. (See addendum 2). As recently stated by this State's Supreme Court,
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" Bias and prejudice are only improper when they are personal. A
feeling of ill will or, conversely, favoritism toward one of the parties
to a suit are what constitute disqualifying bias or prejudice."
In re Young. 984 P.2d 997, 1007 (Utah 1999).
Moreover, it is the duty of the Judge, not of counsel, to disqualify himself when
the judge knows of a basis for disqualification. Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v.
Reichert. 830 P.2d at 257 fn. 7 (Utah 1992). Obviously, Judge Young knew of the
Complaint filed against him in 1997. (Addendum 2, at its last page; indicating that the
Judge will be provided with information concerning the complaint). He also knew from
the lower court's case file that George L. Wright was representing Austin. Therefore,
the lower judge had a duty to disqualify himself, since knowledge of the basis of
disqualification can reasonably be imputed to him.

Nevertheless, a trial judge's failure to disqualify himself based on the appearance
of bias may be grounds for reversal if actual prejudice is shown. See State v. Gardner.
789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990).
Actual prejudice can be shown when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result
would have been more favorable for a party absent the trial judge's appearance of bias.
See. State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d at 278. Also, the failure of a trial judge to recuse even
where he should have, based on the appearance of possible bias or prejudice, does not
require reversal unless the "substantial rights of the party are affected. Id. Austin now
addresses these requirements pertaining to prejudice.
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a. There is a Reasonable Likelihood That The Result of Austin's
Petition Would Have Been More Favorable to Her if Judge Young
Would Have Disqualified himself.
In general, Galetka's Motion to Dismiss argued that since Austin did not raise
the arguments contained in her Post Conviction Petition in her initial appeal, her
Petition should be dismissed. (R. 97). Although Judge Young premised the dismissal of
Austin's petition upon the claim that it was without opposition, Austin undeniably
opposed Galetka's Motion to dismiss in the form of her written Opposition to Galetka's
Motion to Dismiss as set forth earlier in this brief's Argument I. ( R. 152). Thus, it is
more than clear that Austin opposed Galetka's motion to dismiss. A fair and reasonable
judge would have simply looked through the court file and determined that Austin's
Opposition Brief unequivocally opposed Galetka's motion to dismiss.
Not only so, on June 7, 1999, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Austin
through counsel argued orally against Galetka's motion to dismiss. (R. 202). From this
is it clear that the outcome of this case would have been different if a unbiased Judge
had presided over Austin's petition. This is so because a reasonable judge would not
have dismissed the case because it was without opposition. In fact, Judge Dever, Judge
Young's predecessor had already determined that a hearing was to take place after
Austin filed her Amended Petition and Galetka had filed his response. (Addendum 1 at
p. 3). Instead of conducting a hearing on the matter in accord with Judge Dever, Judge
Young dismissed the Petition upon questionable grounds. Therefore, if Judge Dever
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had continued as judge, Austin would have had a hearing on the merits of her Petition.
Prejudice is evident.
Please also note, that in denying Austin's Petition for mootness, Judge Young
refused to address the merits of the Petition. This is true because "[w]hen declaring an
issue moot, a court specifically declines to address the merits." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d
840, 842 n.5 (Utah 1994). Therefore, the commandeering of her court ordered hearing
prejudiced Austin.
b. A Since Austin's Substantial Right to A Fair Hearing has been
affected. The Lower Judge's Failure To Disqualify Himself (Based
On The Appearance Of Possible Bias Or Prejudice), Requires
Reversal.
The failure of a trial judge to recuse even where he should have, based on the
appearance of possible bias or prejudice, does not require reversal unless the substantial
rights of the party are affected. See, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278.1d.
A fair hearing necessarily includes an impartial tribunal. See, Marcello v.
Bonds. 349 U.S. 302, 315; (1955); (Justices Black and Frankfurter dissenting). In this
case, given the afore-mentioned appearance of bias together with the lower courts
bizarre rulings as set forth above, it is apparent that Ms. Austin has been denied her
right to a fair tribunal relating to her Petition. Since the right to a fair tribunal is
essentially a due process right, Austin's due process rights under the United States
Constitution and Utah Constitution have also been violated. (U.S
§ 1; Utah CONST, art. I § 7.).
25
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Also note that the lower court also based its dismissal on the claim that the
matter was moot since Austin was released. As stated, Austin was on parole when her
Petition was dismissed. Release on parole does not render a petition for habeas corpus
moot because parole 'imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain
freedom." Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Jones
v. Cunningham. 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377, (1963)). Furthermore, a
criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral
legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron
v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1889. Since Austin would definitely be
subject to the possibility of collateral legal consequences of her conviction, her Petition
is not moot.
Therefore, by the lower court's incorrect and adverse ruling Austin has been
prejudiced, having been denied a substantial right, the right to a fair tribunal. See.
Marcello v. Bonds. 349 U.S. 302, 315; (1955); (Justices Black and Frankfurter
dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Austin, based on the foregoing, requests that the dismissal of her Petition be
reversed with an Order prohibiting Judge Young from presiding over this case in any
manner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2000.

George
Attorney for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on this the ^<pday of April, 2000,1 caused a true and copies
of the foregoing document to be delivered to the court and mailed to the persons named
below, overnight FEDEX:
Catherine Johnson
Utah Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

\JLj4J2frjtepfge L. Wright
George

28

ADDENDUM 1

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN v«. HANK GALETKA
£E NUMBER 990300028 Post Conv Rel NonCap

JRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L. A. DEVER
IRTIES
Petitioner - JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN
Represented by: GEORGE WRIGHT
Respondent - HANK GALETKA
Represented by: ERIN RILEY
CCOUNT SUMMARY
ASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
)l-08-99 Filed: Petition For Extraordinary Relief
roenag
31-08-99 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Petition For Extraordinary Relief roenag
)l-08-99 Filed; Affidavit Of Jennifer Gwen Austin In Support Of Her
Petition For Extraordinary Relief
roenag
31-11-99 Case filed by roenag
roenag
31-11-99 Judge DEVER assigned.
roenag
02-18-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on March IS, 1999 at 11:00 AM in
Room 321 with Judge DEVER.
roenaa
02-16-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 590772
roenag
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE,
Date.' 3/15/99
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84074
before Judge L, A. DEVER
The reason for the change is Clerk error.
02-26-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Cancelled.
roenag
Reason: Clerk error*
02-26-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on March 15, 1999 at 11:00 AM in
Room 321 with Judge DEVER.
roenaa
02-26-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 594463
roenag
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE.

Printed: 01/10/00 13;50:37
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USE NUMBER 990300028 Post Conv Rel NonCap
Date: 3/15/99
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84074
before Judge L. A. DEVER
The reason for the change is Clerk error,
3-15-99 HEARING scheduled on June 07, 1999 at 02;00 PM in Room 321 with
Judge DEVER.
juiiek
(3-15-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Post Conv Rel NonCap
juiiek
Judge:
L. A. DEVER
Clerk:
juiiek
Video
Tape Count: 11:32

George Wright and Jeff Gray are available by telephone for a
conference with the court. The respondent represents a Motion to
Dismiss ia forthcoming. The court orders Attorney General to
respond to petitioner's memo by 4/15/99* Mr. Wright to answer by
5/17/99. A hearing is set 6/7/99 at 2:00 p.m. A copy of this file
and criminal file on petitioner is to be provided to Mr. Gray.
HEARING is scheduled.
Date; 06/07/1999
Time: 02*00 p.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84 074
before Judge L. A. DEVER
03-16-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 602725
juiiek
HEARING.
Date: 6/7/99
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 840 74
before Judge L. A. DEVER
The reason for the change is Court Ordered
03-16-99 HEARING scheduled on June 07, 1999 at 02:00 PM in Room 321 with
Judge DEVER.
juiiek
03-16-99 HEARING Cancelled.
04-15-99 Filed: Motion To Dismiss
roenag
04-15-99 Filed: REspcndent's Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In
Support Of Motion To Dismiss
roenag
05-19-99 Filed: Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Respondent's

Frinted: 01/10/00 13:50:39
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£E NUMBER 990300028 Post Ccnv Rel NonCap
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Amend Petition for
Extraordinary Relief
5-07-99 Filed: Notice OF Substitution
5-07-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion
Judge:
L. A. DEVER
Clerk;
juliek
PRESENT

marlyn:
roenag
juliek

Petitioner's Attorney; GEORGE WRIGHT
Petitioner (0) ; JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN
Attorney for the Respondent: ERIN RILEY
Video
Tape Count; 4;20

HEARING
Oral argument is heard on State's motion to dismiss. Court allows
plaintiff to file an amended petition. Mr. Wright may call for a
hearing date after he files the petition,
36-11-99 Filed: Amended Petition For Extraordinary Relief
roenag
)7~06-99 Filed; Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for
Enlargement of Time To Respond to Petition
marlynr
37-26-99 Filed; Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
sharonc
LO-08-99 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
sharonc
U-01-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY-ORDER
uman
Judge:
DAVID YOUNG
Clerk:
uman
Video

HEARING
The Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without opposition.
In addition, the Court notes that Petitioner has been released,
thereby making her petition moot.
This signed minute entry shall serve as the order of the court.
C.C. to Counsel.
11-23-99 Filed: Request for Transcript
marlynr
11-23-99 Filed: Order for Transcript
marlynr
12-01-99 Filed: Notice Of Appeal (ccpy of appeal forwarded to court of
appeals this date)
roen&g
12-01-59 Filed; Request For Transcripts
roenag
12-06-99 Filed: Letter from Utah Court Of Appeals
roenag
12-09-99 Filed: Transcript (Motion To Dismiss)
roenag

Printed: Ol/10/OO 13:50:41
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ADDENDUM 2

r*

Itate ot Uta
JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION
Steven H. Stewart
Executive Director

645 South 200 East *104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801 \ 533-3200
FAX801\533-3208

George L. Wright
Name
243 E a s t 400 S o u t h , #301
Address
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
City/State/Zip Code
(801) 575-6610
Telephone Number

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINT
TO:

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION
I request that the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission undertake an investigation of
Judge David S. Young

, a member of the judiciary of the State

of Utah.

(Please provide a full factual statement upon which the complaint is based, together with the title
of the case and case number, if known. Also, include the names, addresses and telephone
numbers of other persons who can substantiate your complaint. If the complaint is documented
or if you have documents supporting your contention you should supply copies of these
documents to us with your complaint.)
This complaint flows from the actions of Judge Young in the case
of Jan DeBry v. Robert DeBry, Case No- 960903322

PLEASE COMPLETE YOUR COMPLAINT ON REVERSE SIDE

See "FACTS" a t t a c h e d

Qf space is not sufficient, you should attach additional pages. Also attach anv Exhibits vou wish
us tP consider.)

Complai
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
, 19*97 , personally appeared before
On the
day of May
me George L. Wright
the signer of the above document, who being first duly
sworn did say that the matters and things stated therein are true to the best of his/her knowledge,
information and belief.

My commission expires:
NOTAKV PUBLIC
'0557 South Crocus Street
t i Sandy, UT840*4
My Commission Expire*
January i 9 t 2001
STATE OF i r r i u

FACTS
Because of rulings that I believed to be unfair against my client, Jan DeBry, in the
case of DeBry v. DeBry (a tort action), I decided to investigate whether or not there was
a relationship between Judge Young and Robert DeBry, of any of the law firms
representing him.
In my investigation I discovered that Judge Young's committee (the Committee
for Judicial Excellence) received re-election contributions from the firm of Berman,
Gaufin, Tomsic, and Savage. The publication of that firm's name and donation violated
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After investigation I have concluded that Judge Young violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct in his struggle to retain the bench in last November's election.
Canon 5 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a candidate shall not
make pledges or promise of conduct in office other than faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office.

A picture of Judge Young appeared on the Salt Lake Tribune

several days before last November's election. Under his picture were the words "David S
Young, A Tough Judge." Although no verbal promise was directly made by Judge
Young, his picture, taken together with those words conveys a message that if Judge
Young is re-elected, he will be tough, conservative, and traditional, rather than sensitive,
liberal and progressive. This advertisement conveys partially towards the politically
conservative.
Canon 5(c )(2) states that a candidate shall not"... Solicit publicly stated
support..." The advertisement listed names of attorneys who supported Judge Young.
By allowing his picture to appear on the advertisement Judge Young solicited publicly the

stated support on the attorneys listed. The language of Cannon 5(c )(2) indicates that
indirect solicitation of publicly stated support is not permitted
Either Judge Young knowingly allowed his committee to use his picture along with
publicly stated endorsement, or his committee used his picture negligently. In either case,
that advertisement, due to the picture and the endorsements, brings the judicial office into
disrepute because of the prejudice it conveys.
Canon 5(c )(2) allows committees established by a judge to solicit campaign
contributions and support from lawyers. Also, the lawyers must be told that their
contributions will not be known to the judge or the candidate. Judge Young's committee,
the Committee for Judicial Excellence, made public the names of attorneys who
contributed and the amounts they donated. Due to this disclosure, on November 4, 1996,
the Salt Lake Tribune published an article that named two law firms that made
contributions to Judge Young's committee and amounts given. Those law firms are Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker and Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage. (See. Salt Lake Tribune
article attached hereto as exhibit A). One of these lawfirms,Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and
Savage, is representing Robert DeBry against Jan DeBry. The Salt Lake Tribune stated
that thisfirmwas one of the two largest contributors to Judge Young's struggle to retain
the bench. During that time the Judge's committee continued to advertise in the Salt Lake
Tribune. Therefore it is very likely that the Judge knew about the contributions of Berman,
Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage.
In accordance with Section 78-7-28(1) "A justice, judge, or justice court judge of
any court of this state in accordance with the procedure prescribed in this section, may be
removed from office, suspended, censured, involuntarily retired, or publicly or privately

reprimanded f o r . . . (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a
judicial office into disrepute "
I believe that Judge Young has demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice in the tort case of DeBry v. DeBry.
The first occasion occurred when Judge Young, after exhibiting a hostile attitude
towards Ms. Van Dijk, Jan DeBry's current divorce attorney, and refusing to allow her to
complete her argument, ruled that Dr. Noel Gardner be permitted to perform an IME on
Jan DeBry. Dr. Gardner had previously filed an affidavit for the Defendant which
demonstrated that he (Gardner) had already formed an opinion about Jan DeBry, and was
not therefore qualified to perform an unbiased, unprejudiced IME.
The second occasion occurred when Judge Young allowed an expedited
telephonic argument (without having received a Motion for Expedited Hearing) on a
Motion for Protective Order brought by Mr. DeBry's counsel, Sid Baucom. This
telephonic argument occurred within 24 hours after the filing of the Motion for Protective
Order, and Plaintiffs counsel was not given an opportunity to research the motion or to
reply to the motion in writing, but was forced to argue the motion without the benefit of
research. Judge Young then ruled in favor of the Defendant. Defendant's counsel
prepared a written Order, and presented the same to the Judge for signature. Judge
Young signed the order the same day, and failed to allow the required five days for me to
object to the Order in accordance with Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
I believe that the conduct of Judge Young warrants investigation by the Judicial
Conduct Committee.

I

O
JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

Steven H. Stewart f
Executive Director
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645 South 200 East #1TM
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
80U533-3200
FAX801\533-3208

RELEASE
WHEREAS, I have filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission of the State
of Utah, against a member of the Judiciary, and
WHEREAS, it will be necessary in the investigation of said matter, by the Commission or
its Investigator, that the Judge be provided information concerning the complaint and/or a copy of
that complaint.
NOW THEREFORE, I do hereby authorize the Judicial Conduct Commission to
-communicate my complaint to the Judge of whom I have complained, and to exhibit said written
complaint to said Judge, and to discuss the same with the Judge or other court personnel, or other
persons having knowledge of the matter.
DATED this

Of May

, 19#

Signature^" Complainant

^

George L, Wrigh*
Please type or print name in full

Witnesi

frNo,

ADDENDUM 3

V

1 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
M i c h a e l O. L e a v i t t
Governor
EL L . H a u n
Executive Director

1 Orange Street Community
1 Correctional Center
I 80 South Orange Street
I Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

Mr. George Wright, Esq.
1600 Dove Street
Suite 130
Newport Beach, CA 92660

November 16, 1999
Dear Mr. Wright,
As per our telephone conversation yesterday, I am writing to confirm the dates parolee Jennifer
Austin has been a resident of the Orange Street Community Correctional Center (OSCCC).
Ms. Austin arrived here on July 6, 1999. In August, she transferred from the OSCCC women's
program into the OSCCC mentally ill offender program.
Ms. Austin has made satisfactory progress in the mentally ill offender program. She is
scheduled for release on November 23,1999.
In summary, Ms. Austin has resided at OSCCC from July 6, 1999 to the present.
Please feel free to contact me at (801) 596-6316 if you have any other questions.

Sincerely Yours,

zl

></Wo«

Deborah Davidson, Director
Orange Street Community Correctional Center

cc:

Jennifer Austin
Subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public

day ofMlMAJ«W999.

I

WILMA EDWARDS ASHLEY |
80 South Orange Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
My Commission Expire*

_
|

February 7,2002

I

C*4a*iJiii.k

t h i s f(o

a

NOTARY P U B L I C u
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
Expires: 2 . - ^
flft^

